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ded_vasilijCharles Lane: Can Putin’s regime withstand falling oil prices?
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Will plummeting oil prices succeed in reining in Vladimir Putin’s aggressive foreign policy where Western diplomacy and economic sanctions have so far failed? Might the shock to Russia’s oil-exporting economy be so great as to destabilize Putin’s regime itself?
“It is not clear,” writes Martin Feldstein, the eminent Harvard economist, whether Putin’s regime (or similar ones in Iran and Venezuela) “could survive a substantial and sustained future decline in oil prices.”
It depends on who has the more accurate view of authoritarian power dynamics: Yegor Gaidar or Emmanuel Goldstein.
Gaidar, who died five years ago, is best known as an economist, a senior official in Boris Yeltsin’s post-Soviet Russian government and a promoter of the thesis that the Soviet Union collapsed largely because of a sharp drop in oil prices, brought about by Saudi Arabia’s decision in September 1985 to increase production.
The Saudi move, which Gaidar portrayed as a deliberate attempt to loosen Moscow’s grip on what was then a Cold War battlefield in Afghanistan, cost the Soviets approximately $20 billion a year, “money without which the country simply could not survive,” as he put it in a 2007 essay.
Desperate for cash — but unable to borrow from the West and incapable of reforming the Soviet economy rapidly through his program of perestroika — then-Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev found himself with no option but “to begin immediate negotiations [with the West] about the conditions of surrender,” according to Gaidar.
Gaidar warned Russia’s post-Soviet rulers that “the collapse of the Soviet Union should serve as a lesson to those who construct policy based on the assumption that oil prices will remain perpetually high.” And one of those lessons was that “authoritarian regimes, although displaying a facade of strength, are fragile in crisis.”
Putin, of course, lived through the Soviet collapse as a bitterly disappointed KGB officer stationed in East Germany, and he drew his own conclusions from it. One result is that his regime prudently put some oil revenue in a reserve fund. Putin also learned, though, that the Soviet collapse was, in his words, “a geopolitical catastrophe” — one that not only had economic causes but also reflected the fecklessness of the U.S.S.R.’s leaders, “who just threw everything away and left,” as he once put it.
Or so one would conclude from his recent defiant behavior, which includes dipping into his nation’s cash reserves, allowing the ruble to float, implying that Russia is a victim of a new geopolitical conspiracy and cracking down on any hint of domestic political dissent — but not retreating from Ukraine or renouncing his plan for a neo-Soviet Eurasian Economic Union.
Which brings us to Emmanuel Goldstein, who was not an actual political analyst but rather a character in George Orwell’s “1984.” In the novel, Goldstein’s secretly circulated book, “The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism,” fictionalized what was undoubtedly Orwell’s own view about a repressive system’s true sources of vulnerability — and survival.
“There are only four ways in which a ruling group can fall from power,” Goldstein writes: It can be conquered from outside; it can govern so inefficiently that it stirs mass revolt; it can incubate a discontented middle class; or the ruling group itself “loses its own self-confidence and willingness to govern.”
All four factors played a part in the collapse of the great regimes and empires of history, Goldstein observed; certainly all four contributed, directly or indirectly, to the Soviet Union’s downfall a half-century after the publication of “1984.”
Yet in Goldstein’s schema nothing was more important than the will of the dictatorship to cling to power by any means necessary, which could trump all other threats to regime survival: “Ultimately the determining factor is the mental attitude of the ruling class itself.”
Certainly the differing fates of the Soviet Union and Communist China in 1989 suggest that Goldstein had a point. Whereas Gorbachev attempted to take the Soviet Union on a tactical retreat that turned into a rout, the Chinese ruthlessly gunned down hundreds at Tiananmen Square and remained in control. The same goes for smaller regimes, such as those in North Korea, Cuba and Zimbabwe, whose Cold War-vintage rulers have weathered historic economic crises and held on to power far longer than many once predicted.
In authoritarian politics, as in life, attitude is everything, or almost everything. Those who hope that falling oil prices, or Western sanctions, or a combination of the two, will force a change of course in Moscow — much less a change of regime — must reckon with the fact that Putin has seen that scenario once already, in Gorbachev’s time. And he seems determined that the sequel, if any, will end differently.
Will plummeting oil prices succeed in reining in Vladimir Putin’s aggressive foreign policy where Western diplomacy and economic sanctions have so far failed? Might the shock to Russia’s oil-exporting economy be so great as to destabilize Putin’s regime itself?
“It is not clear,” writes Martin Feldstein, the eminent Harvard economist, whether Putin’s regime (or similar ones in Iran and Venezuela) “could survive a substantial and sustained future decline in oil prices.”
It depends on who has the more accurate view of authoritarian power dynamics: Yegor Gaidar or Emmanuel Goldstein.
Gaidar, who died five years ago, is best known as an economist, a senior official in Boris Yeltsin’s post-Soviet Russian government and a promoter of the thesis that the Soviet Union collapsed largely because of a sharp drop in oil prices, brought about by Saudi Arabia’s decision in September 1985 to increase production.
The Saudi move, which Gaidar portrayed as a deliberate attempt to loosen Moscow’s grip on what was then a Cold War battlefield in Afghanistan, cost the Soviets approximately $20 billion a year, “money without which the country simply could not survive,” as he put it in a 2007 essay.
Desperate for cash — but unable to borrow from the West and incapable of reforming the Soviet economy rapidly through his program of perestroika — then-Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev found himself with no option but “to begin immediate negotiations [with the West] about the conditions of surrender,” according to Gaidar.
Gaidar warned Russia’s post-Soviet rulers that “the collapse of the Soviet Union should serve as a lesson to those who construct policy based on the assumption that oil prices will remain perpetually high.” And one of those lessons was that “authoritarian regimes, although displaying a facade of strength, are fragile in crisis.”
Putin, of course, lived through the Soviet collapse as a bitterly disappointed KGB officer stationed in East Germany, and he drew his own conclusions from it. One result is that his regime prudently put some oil revenue in a reserve fund. Putin also learned, though, that the Soviet collapse was, in his words, “a geopolitical catastrophe” — one that not only had economic causes but also reflected the fecklessness of the U.S.S.R.’s leaders, “who just threw everything away and left,” as he once put it.
Or so one would conclude from his recent defiant behavior, which includes dipping into his nation’s cash reserves, allowing the ruble to float, implying that Russia is a victim of a new geopolitical conspiracy and cracking down on any hint of domestic political dissent — but not retreating from Ukraine or renouncing his plan for a neo-Soviet Eurasian Economic Union.
Which brings us to Emmanuel Goldstein, who was not an actual political analyst but rather a character in George Orwell’s “1984.” In the novel, Goldstein’s secretly circulated book, “The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism,” fictionalized what was undoubtedly Orwell’s own view about a repressive system’s true sources of vulnerability — and survival.
“There are only four ways in which a ruling group can fall from power,” Goldstein writes: It can be conquered from outside; it can govern so inefficiently that it stirs mass revolt; it can incubate a discontented middle class; or the ruling group itself “loses its own self-confidence and willingness to govern.”
All four factors played a part in the collapse of the great regimes and empires of history, Goldstein observed; certainly all four contributed, directly or indirectly, to the Soviet Union’s downfall a half-century after the publication of “1984.”
Yet in Goldstein’s schema nothing was more important than the will of the dictatorship to cling to power by any means necessary, which could trump all other threats to regime survival: “Ultimately the determining factor is the mental attitude of the ruling class itself.”
Certainly the differing fates of the Soviet Union and Communist China in 1989 suggest that Goldstein had a point. Whereas Gorbachev attempted to take the Soviet Union on a tactical retreat that turned into a rout, the Chinese ruthlessly gunned down hundreds at Tiananmen Square and remained in control. The same goes for smaller regimes, such as those in North Korea, Cuba and Zimbabwe, whose Cold War-vintage rulers have weathered historic economic crises and held on to power far longer than many once predicted.
In authoritarian politics, as in life, attitude is everything, or almost everything. Those who hope that falling oil prices, or Western sanctions, or a combination of the two, will force a change of course in Moscow — much less a change of regime — must reckon with the fact that Putin has seen that scenario once already, in Gorbachev’s time. And he seems determined that the sequel, if any, will end differently.
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Preklad do slovenčiny
Udrží sa Putin pri moci? Čítajte Orwella, sú v ňom štyri faktory
Píše Charles Lane, komentátor "The Washington Post"
Budú mať klesajúce ceny ropy vplyv na agresívnu zahraničnú politiku ruského prezidenta Vladimira Putina, keď sa zdá, že západná diplomacia a ekonomické sankcie v tomto ohľade zlyhali? Môže byť šok pre ruskú ekonomiku, ktorá je závislá od exportu ropy, taký veľký, aby destabilizoval samotný Putinov režim?
„Nie je jasné,“ píše Martin Feldstein, vynikajúci ekonóm z Harvardovej univerzity, či Putinov režim (ale tiež režimy v iných ropných krajinách ako Venezuela či Irán) „môže prežiť budúcnosť charakterizovanú zásadným a trvalým poklesom cien ropy.“
Šlo o peniaze
Odpoveď závisí od toho, kto mal presnejší odhad dynamiky autoritatívnej moci: Jegor Gajdar alebo Emmanuel Goldstein.
Gajdar, ktorý zomrel pred piatimi rokmi, bol známy najmä ako ekonóm a vrcholný úradník v postsovietskej ruskej vlády prezidenta Borisa Jeľcina a propagátor tézy, že Sovietsky zväz skolaboval do veľkej miery preto, že v dôsledku rozhodnutia Saudskej Arábie zo septembra 1985, že zvýši produkciu ropy, prudko klesli jej ceny.
Saudskoarabské rozhodnutie, ktoré Gajdar označoval ako zámerný pokus uvoľniť sovietske zovretie Afganistanu, ktorý bol vtedy dôležitým bojiskom studenej vojny, stálo Sovietsky zväz približne dvadsať miliárd dolárov ročne. Ako napísal v eseji z roku 2007, šlo o „peniaze, bez ktorých krajina jednoducho nemohla prežiť.“
V dôsledku nedostatku hotovosti, ale tiež preto, že si nebol schopný požičať od Západu a nebol ani schopný prostredníctvom perestrojky rýchlo zreformovať sovietsku ekonomiku, vtedajší sovietsky líder Michail Gorbačov podľa Gajdara zistil, že nemá inú možnosť než „začať okamžité rokovania so Západom o podmienkach kapitulácie“.
pokračovanie...
Gajdar varoval postsovietskych vládcov Ruska, že „kolaps Sovietskeho zväzu by mal slúžiť ako ponaučenie tým, ktorí zakladajú svoju politiku na predpoklade, že ceny ropy zostanú stále vysoké.“ Jednou zo spomínaných lekcií bolo, že „autoritatívne režimy, hoci sa skrývajú za fasádu sily, sú v krízach krehké“.
Ale Vladimir Putin prežil kolaps ZSSR ako trpko sklamaný dôstojník KGB vo východnom Nemecku a vzal si z toho svoje vlastné ponaučenia. Jedným z nich je, že jeho režim obozretne odkladá časť zo ziskov z predaja ropy do rezervného fondu. Putin sa tiež poučil, že hoci bol kolaps Sovietskeho zväzu „geopolitickou katastrofou“, nespôsobili ho len ekonomické dôvody, ale aj slaboštvo lídrov ZSSR, ktorí, ako raz povedal, „len všetko zahodili a odišli.“
Z jeho nedávneho vzdorovitého správania sa však dá odvodiť aj iná vec. Načiera do zásob hotovosti, ktoré nazhromaždil, implikuje, že Rusko je obeťou novej geopolitickej konšpirácie, a rozbíja každý pokus o domáci politický disent, ale zároveň zostáva na Ukrajine a nevzdáva sa plánu vybudovať neosovietsku eurázijskú ekonomickú úniu.
Strata vôle k moci
A to nás privádza k Emmanuelovi Goldsteinovi, ktorý nebol skutočným politickým analytikom, ale jednou z postáv románu Georgea Orwella 1984. Na jej stránkach sa objavuje Goldsteinova kniha Teória a prax oligarchického kolektivizmu, ktorá nepochybne prezentovala pohľad samotného Orwella na skutočné zdroje zraniteľnosti represívneho systému, ako aj na zdroje jeho schopnosti prežiť.
„Existujú len štyri spôsoby, ako môže prísť vládnuca skupina o moc,“ píše Goldstein, môže byť dobytá zvonku; môže vládnuť tak neefektívne, že vyvolá masovú revoltu; môže vytvoriť nespokojnú strednú triedu; alebo môže sama „stratiť sebadôveru a vôľu vládnuť“.
Goldstein si všimol, že pri kolapsoch veľkých ríš v histórii hrali úlohu všetky štyri faktory. A všetky štyri pol storočia po vydaní románu 1984 priamo či nepriamo prispeli k úpadku Sovietskeho zväzu.
Ale v Goldsteinovej schéme nebolo nič dôležitejšie ako vôľa diktatúry udržať sa pri moci akýmikoľvek nevyhnutnými prostriedkami, čo môže stačiť na potlačenie všetkých ostatných hrozieb, ktorým režim čelí: „Nakoniec je určujúcim faktorom mentálny postoj samotnej vládnucej triedy.“
pokračovanie 2....
Napokon, odlišný osud Sovietskeho zväzu a komunistickej Číny v roku 1989 ukazujú, že Goldstein mal pravdu. Vtedy, keď sa Gorbačov rozhodol, že so Sovietskym zväzom podnikne taktický ústup, ktorý sa nakoniec zmenil na porážku, Číňania drsne zabili stovky ľudí na Námestí nebeského pokoja a udržali si kontrolu nad krajinou. To isté sa týka aj menších krajín, ako sú Severná Kórea, Kuba či Zimbabwe, kde vládcovia z čias studenej vojny prežili ekonomickú krízu a udržali sa omnoho dlhšie, ako mnohí kedysi predpokladali.
V politike autoritatívnych režimov je tento prístup všetkým či takmer všetkým. Tí, ktorí dúfajú, že padajúce ceny ropy či západné sankcie či kombinácia oboch donútia Moskvu zmeniť kurz či dokonca zmeniť režim, sa musia vyrovnať s faktom, že Putin už tento scenár videl v Gorbačovových časoch. A zdá sa, že pokračovanie tohto filmu sa skončí inak.